Start with evidence, not the verdict
This workflow is for release engineers, security reviewers, and operations teams who receive a known file with a published digest and a detached signature. Keep an untouched copy, record where it came from, and capture the expected algorithm, checksum, signature encoding, and public-key fingerprint before running a tool.
Separate the two trust questions
Use file-hash-verifier to calculate a digest over the exact file bytes. If the signature covers a canonical text manifest or another explicit message, use hash-generator only for that exact representation. These results live in different domains unless the signing specification says otherwise.
Use checksum-comparator to compare the local digest with the publisher's checksum. A match is useful byte-level evidence, but it does not prove the publisher authored the file. The checksum source must itself be trusted.
Verify the detached signature
Use ed25519-x25519-keygen-signature-verifier in verification mode with the exact signed message, detached signature, and public key. Preserve the encoding and serialization used at signing time. A false result can come from changed bytes or formatting; a true result still requires a separate decision that the public-key fingerprint belongs to the expected signer.
Record an acceptance decision
Finish with three explicit fields: file integrity result, signature result, and public-key trust result. Accept only when the expected digest matches, the signature validates over the intended payload, and the key was confirmed through the approved channel. If any field is unknown or fails, mark the artifact for review instead of converting partial evidence into a provenance claim.